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Ceard is one of the most impoverished states in Brazil having endured hundreds
of years of recurring droughts. Political will and clever planning brought rapid changes
to this small state. In 1987 Ceard had one of the highest infant mortality rates of Brazil's
Northeast states. By 1992 infant mortality fell to the lowest in the Northeast. Improved
health conditions in Ceard gained the attention of people all over the world. In noting
Ceard's achievements, researchers consistently commend the state's Health Agent
Program, Programa de Agente de Saide, (PAS) which employs 7,000 paraprofessionals
to provide primary health care information to most of the state's population. The current
study examines the program and attempts to answer one general question -- why did this
program work?
To answer this question this study examines the program's history, evolution, and
specific program features. The study also explores how the program overcame the
institutional, political, economic, and social barriers in Ceard, and the obstacles faced by
these types of programs. Community Health Worker programs often face barriers when
implemented by governments because their large, bureaucratic, and top-down structures
do not respond quickly or well to specific, individual community needs. Although PAS
is a government program, the program responsibility is divided between the state and
municipal governments creating a more manageable program.
The study finds that the program's good performance can also be explained by
the preparation and experience of certain individuals and groups years before the
program's implementation. The program's linkage to government, and implementation
in conjunction with reform of the state's public health system, is also a key to the
program's success. This analysis points out that the impacts of the program go beyond
the reduction of disease by providing lessons in inter-sectoral cooperation, institutional
development, political commitment, scaling up, and reform.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy
One of the poorest areas in Brazil shows the rest of the world how to reduce
infant mortality dramatically (Time, May 6, 1991).
No country or state has obtained the same dramatic results in the same short
period of time (Brazil's UNICEF representative, Newsweek, September 2,
1991).
Being poor is no obstacle to being well governed (The Economist, December
7, 1991).
1. INTRODUCTION
These comments from articles throughout the world refer to Ceard, one of the
poorest states in Brazil's Northeastern region. Before 1987 one in ten babies died
before reaching its first birthday, and Church bells tolled for every lost young life.
Most infants died from preventable illnesses such as dehydration from severe diarrhea
and infectious diseases. Only 25% of children in Ceard were vaccinated against
measles and polio. Today over 90% are vaccinated, and most families now know
how to prevent dehydration. Ceari's infant mortality rate is nearly 35% lower than it
was just five years ago, dropping from 100 to roughly 65 per 1000 between 1987 and
1991. The government of Ceard credits its Health Agent Program, Programa de
Agente de Sadlde (PAS), for saving so many young lives. And today, the Church
bells toll far less often.
PAS is a state community health worker program (CHW) which started in
1987 and employs more than 7,000 paraprofessionals to provide primary health care
information to most of the state's 6.5 million people. The team of health agents,
spread throughout the small rural state, far exceeds in number the fewer than 1,000
doctors and nurses in the state's interior.
PAS shares many characteristics with most of the non-governmental, religious,
and governmental CHW programs that have existed throughout the developing world
since the 1940s.1 Community health workers are typically local people who undergo
brief training in preventive and some simple curative health care such as perinatal
information, immunizations, oral rehydration therapy, nutritional surveillance,
hygiene, first aid, and other basic health care. They often serve as extensions to their
local health system, earning a small salary to visit homes in their villages and provide
information usually targeted to mothers and children under five. Another role of most
national CHW programs is to fulfill a commitment to increase universal access to
primary health care (PHC) (MacCormack 1983).
In 1978 representatives from most of the world's nations met in Alma Ata for
the International Conference on Primary Health Care to assert that by reforming the
health system to incorporate PHC, the conditions of poor marginalized populations
would improve. Following the conference, many countries implemented CHW
programs to achieve one of the fundamental requirements of PHC: that the community
participate in identifying and solving its own health conditions.
Despite the enhanced international acceptance of CHW programs, many large
scale national CHW programs have faced serious problems, and criticism of CHW
1Countries use different terms to describe their health workers: barefoot doctors, village health volunteers,
family welfare educators, health promoters, rural health aides, or health agents (as in Ceard).
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programs has increased (Jancloes 1984, Skeet 1984, Roemer 1986, Bourne 1987,
Hammond 1987, Walt et al. 1988, WHO 1989, Gilson et al. 1989.) First, the CHW
scheme often does not fulfill the objective of incorporating the community into
decision-making and identification of its own health needs (Skeet 1984). Second, the
CHWs are not integrated into the current health systems, usually because nations
adopt CHW programs as an appendage to their existing systems, without concern for
or commitment to universal health reform (Gilson et al. 1989). Third, CHW
programs often suffer from minimal political commitment, lack of support, poorly
defined functions, and inadequate selection, training, and supervision of health
workers (WHO 1989).
The PAS program in Ceard is one of the most effective government CHW
programs in the developing world because it has overcome many of these institutional
problems and political barriers that plague programs elsewhere. Most striking, the
program has contributed to lowering the infant mortality rate within an extremely
poor region of Brazil with a legacy of unequal income distribution, recurring drought,
political corruption and, perhaps most significant, a health system that has historically
neglected the most needy population. The drop in infant mortality, the factor that
brought international attention to PAS and also brought me to Ceard to study the
program, is one of its many accomplishments.
While PAS is a health program, the findings of this study should interest an
audience beyond those immediately involved in health planning and policy, and
beyond just the region of Ceard, or Brazil. The Ceard PAS experience contains
lessons on "good government," turning a plan into a program, upscaling,
decentralizing responsibilities, and overcoming institutional and political barriers. For
these reasons, the program has an implication beyond merely reducing disease.
This study explores the historical, political, and institutional achievements of
the PAS program. Throughout my research I was guided by one central question:
why did PAS work so well given the adverse economic, political, and social
conditions in the state? Reviewing literature on CHW programs throughout other
regions gave me a basis for comparison and prompted me to ask the following
questions about the program's ability to both exist and perform well:
* How did the PAS program manage to scale up from a small-scale pilot
program to the largest, most successful state program in Brazil when these
programs are seldom successfully scaled up?
* How did the state implement a program based on non-patronage practices in a
political context based on patronage politics?
* Why was the state's governor willing to fund PAS at the same time he was
making the largest budget cuts in the state's history?
* Why did the health system, medical professionals, and the community accept a
preventive health care program when they are much more supportive and
accepting of curative treatment?
* How did a program, dependent on paraprofessionals deal with resistance by
professionals to minimally trained workers?
* How was PAS managed so well by the government when CHW programs are
typically better administered by small-scale, non-governmental organizations?
* How could the state justify employing mostly women in a program that
provides a wage exceeding many men's wages in the state's interior?
* Why were low-paid government employees motivated to perform with energy
and enthusiasm in a drought-stricken, impoverished area?
* How did the state government convince all of the municipal governments to
assume some financial responsibility for the PAS program?
* Why was PAS continued after a drought crisis when all other temporary
employment programs in Ceari were suspended?
These questions guided my inquiry into the program. Chapter 2 provides a
brief background of conditions in Ceard and then describes some details of the PAS
program. Chapter 3 looks at the scaling-up process of PAS from its early pilot stage
to its full-scale implementation. Chapter 4 discusses the program's features that have
helped to overcome the institutional, political, economic, and social barriers that such
programs face. Chapter 5 poses questions about PAS's future and lists concretely the
central reasons for the program's success.
1.1 Methodology
This study is based on three months of fieldwork in the state of Ceard, Brazil
between June and August 1992. I collected most of the data through in-depth
interviews, site observations, materials obtained from the State Department of Health,
and other governmental and non-governmental organizations in Ceard (See Appendix
1). I spent one month in Ceard's state capital, Fortaleza, interviewing administrators
of the State Department of Health and medical professionals at the state level. I spent
the remaining six weeks in several municpios2 in the state's interior where the
program exists.
The two administrative health regions in which I did most of my research were
Iguati and Crateds3 because PAS coordinators identified munic(pios there as having
successful programs (see Table 1.) I also chose them because they were among the
first municipios to implement the program, and had the longest history. I also spent
time in Icapd~i, a municpio on the coast that has had the greatest health improvements
in the state. In addition I accompanied program coordinators on an all-day selection
process of health agents in Geral Sampaio, a munic(pio 75 miles from Fortaleza where
the state recently implemented PAS. 4
In most municipios I spent several days accompanying health agents on bicycle
and on foot in their daily visits to families. I observed their work and interviewed
both them and the families we met as we traveled along. I also interviewed several
families without a health agent present. In total I visited more than 75 households in
Ceard.
2There are three levels of government in Brazil: federal, state and municipio. There are 4,000 municipios
distributed among 23 states and three territories in Brazil. Ceari has 178 municipios. A municipio corresponds
roughly to a county, but differs in that it contains one central township and an outlying rural area. The entire
municipio is governed by an elected "prefeito" (mayor) and a dozen or so councilmen called "vereadores."
3There are 14 administrative health regions in Ceard. They generally encompass between seven and 15
munictpios. Fortaleza is the largest region, with about thirty municipios. Regions carry the name of the largest
municipio.
4These municipios are in the administrative regions of Aracati and Fortaleza. Their populations are
approximately 13,000 and 5,500 respectively.
TABLE 1
POPULATION SIZE OF MUNICIPIOS WITHIN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS OF IGUATU AND CRATEUS
IGUATU CRATEUS
Iguatd Crateds
75,622 66,634
Juc'is Ipaporanga
21,104 10,850
Carius Independencia
17,545 24,033
Quixeld
15,680
Source: IBGE, 1991
I attended approximately ten large group meetings with health agents, their
supervisors and state coordinators and observed more than 50 evaluation meetings
between health agents and nurse supervisors. I also spent about two weeks observing,
interviewing, and accompanying program nurse supervisors in all of the municfpios. I
visited more than 20 health facilities and interviewed doctors, administrators,
politicians, community leaders, community members, and program beneficiaries. In
many of the municpios I stayed with health providers and was able to observe even
the most detailed aspects of their lives -- how they lived, worked, interacted with
their own families, spent their money, among other things. I learned about their
values and beliefs and heard personal stories that helped me form a more realistic
understanding of their circumstances. During my last two weeks in Ceard I
interviewed additional state program coordinators and attended a state health seminar.
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In addition to focusing on PAS, I interviewed people involved with other preventive
health care programs to understand their impact on health in Ceari and their
interaction with the PAS program. I made particular efforts throughout the research
process to ensure that my data were accurate and my procedures non biased by using
different sources, visiting different locations, comparing the information with my
observations and verifying data through multiple interviews. I checked my findings
by changing my research patterns in each new munictpio. For example, in one
munictpio I would visit the health center first and talk with health professionals, then
talk with the health agents, and then the local leaders and families. In the next
municfpio I would visit the families first, then the health agents, then the health staff,
and so on. In this way I could sometimes visit beneficiaries and local leaders without
the health staff knowing I was there and then other times visit the health staff without
the beneficiaries and leaders knowing I was there. I designed this strategy to reduce
bias because many of the munictpios are small, in many instances I was the only
American who had ever visited them, and news of my presence spread quickly.
Another way I checked my findings was to interview people not linked to the
program. It quickly became evident to me that those people connected to the program
-- agents, administrators, supervisors, and beneficiaries -- were mostly quite favorable
to it. I therefore interviewed several nurses in Fortaleza who were not linked to the
program and were critical of it.
I also shared my findings with professors at Harvard's School of Public Health
and Department of Social Medicine, and other medical anthropologists who provided
me with guidance and advice. Because my research is part of a group project at
M.I.T., throughout this process I shared my findings with colleagues who challenged
me and posed questions that required me to cross-check my data and use additional
sources, such as conducting further interviews or referring to the literature.
2. OBSTACLES TO GOOD HEALTH IN CEARA
As I accompanied the health agent into the mud house, the stench of urine,
dried mud, and burning wood struck me sharply causing my eyes to burn and
my breath to become short. A chicken pecking scraps on the floor scurried to
the corner of the kitchen as we entered, and a little boy, naked and dirty,
stood and gazed at me. His eyes remained glued to me as his pacifier fell to
the mud floor and he popped it back into his mouth. His older brother,
perhaps four years old, sat next to the oven, smoke pouring around him. I
heard their baby sister crying in her hammock and watched as her urine
seeped through onto the floor. Their mom finally arrived tired and sweaty
with an infant in one arm and in the other the large tin of water she had just
collectedfrom the distant stream (Author's journal, July, 1992, Iguatei, Ceard
Accompanying a health agent on her daily visits to families).
This scene contrasts sharply with Brazil's image as a rapidly industrializing,
tropical country known for its exotic food, music, and Carnaval. Yet it typifies the
lives of many in the Northeast region of the country where one third of Brazil's 153
million people live. Brazil's powerhouse of wealth and growth is concentrated in the
south, while income levels, living standards, and health conditions in the Northeast
are among the poorest in the world. Brazil's "economic miracle," which brought
increased income to many Brazilians from 1968 to 1974, scarcely trickled down to the
poorest in the Northeast and only exacerbated inequity (Horn 1985:50).
Ceard, one of the poorest of Brazil's nine Northeast states, has borne the brunt
of recurring drought in its semi-arid interior where 4,000,000 of its 6,500,000 people
live. Before 1987, Ceard had the lowest immunization coverage (25 %) of all the
Northeast states, and one of the highest rates of infant mortality (102/1000). The
main cause of infant death in Ceard is diarrhea, followed by respiratory and parasitic
infections, and chronic malnutrition. Low incomes, poor nutrition, inadequate living
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conditions, and health services that are inappropriate for most of the population beget
poor health conditions in Ceard.
Inadequate and unequal incomes are root causes for poor health in Ceard.
More than 65 % of Ceard's land is owned by fewer than 7% of the population (SPCA
1985). Roughly 60% of Ceard's work force receives less than a minimum wage
($US2/day) and in rural areas, nearly 80% earn less than a minimum wage (PNAD
1989). As a result nearly half of Ceard's entire population lacks sufficient income to
meet basic food needs, and 35 % of children up to the age of three years suffer from
moderate to severe malnutrition (Pires de Sousa 1992).
Insufficient sanitation and poor infrastructure contribute to poor health. In
1989, 95% of the state's population had no sewer system, and more than 90% of the
rural population in Ceard was without any kind of piped water connection (PNAD
1989). The rural population is particularly disadvantaged in obtaining health care.
About 76% of the hospitals and 85 % of the doctors and nurses are concentrated in the
capital city of Fortaleza with only 20% of the state's population. In many munictpios
the only health facility is as much as 30 kilometers from people's homes, and few
people have private transportation. Public transportation is unreliable and costly for
many.
Health economists identify that decreased investment for preventive care
services coupled with the increase in curative care since the 1940s perpetuates high
maternal and child deaths rates in Brazil's Northeast (Medici 1987, McGreevey 1988,
Briscoe 1990). With limited primary health care and a concentration of curative
services in urban centers, the health system is both inadequate and inaccessible to
many rural poor. Physician training is overspecialized, oversophisticated, highly
technical and therefore inappropriate to the conditions in poor rural areas, which
require preventive services in addition to curative care (Horn 1985:59). And in rural
areas, health services are generally only minimal general clinic, emergency medical
first aid, and prophylactic vaccine services (Galvio 1991).
Another obstacle to good health in Ceard, as in many parts of Brazil, is the
political system. Medicine is one of the most political tools used by politicians to
influence the population. This is most apparent at the local levels where many
mayors secure political support from constituents by providing selected health services
to individuals rather than providing universal services. I found in many municpios
that instead of purchasing medicines for the hospitals, mayors purchased medicines to
keep in their homes. In this way they distribute them to individual community
members who in turn promise to support them.
The patron-client system is maintained by a community that is used to it and
expects it. An elderly woman in a munictpio related that she convinced her entire
family to vote for a political candidate in exchange for medicine and assistance with
her house. The politician never lived up to his promises, and she changed her
political support when a candidate from a different party provided her with
transportation to the hospital in an emergency. A week before I arrived in another
municfpio, the mayor fired the wife of a candidate for city council from her job at the
hospital. He did this because she questioned why he allowed his son, who was
running for mayor in another town, to use the local ambulance for political
campaigning. Most citizens prefer to keep silent, rather than lose their only
opportunity for income.
Another barrier to better health for the poor is the overcrowded facilities and
often hostile environments. For example, before oral rehydration therapy (ORT)
became accessible early in 1980,' people had to travel great distances to receive
intravenous rehydration in an often insensitive atmosphere. In a typical rehydration
procedure in the hospital, mothers are separated from their screaming babies for
several hours while nurses thrust needles into the babys' scalp for a painful
intraveneous procedure (Nations 1988).
The universal distribution of oral rehydration has reduced popular demand for
such hospital services, lessening, in turn, the need for the poor to face this treatment.
But in addition to developing techniques that decrease the demand for health services,
Ceard's state government recently has endeavored to make public health services more
broadly responsive and accessible. The health agent program, Programa de Agente
de Saide, (PAS) is part of this initiative to provide appropriate information to the
poor and create a bridge between the population and its health services.
5ORT was not distributed in rural communities until 1982 when the Federal Ministry of Health initiated the
Brazilian National Diarrheal Diseases Control Program (Nations 1988).
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2.1 PAS: Seemingly Simple, Actually Complex
Only a few years ago the church bell would ring all the time for babies who
had died. Now we seldom hear it anymore (Woman store owner in Crateds).
People in the backlands of Ceard don't need statistics on infant mortality to
know that fewer children are dying in their neighborhoods. Mothers told me that
whereas before 1987 they expected many of their children to die, now they expect all
of them to live. This is a dramatic change in a short time.
The scene described earlier of the mother returning home with her baby in one
arm and water from a distant stream may typify Northeast Brazil, but in Ceard there
are some important differences. The mother in Ceard knows to boil and filter the
water she just collected. She has chlorine and knows that by putting in one drop for
every two liters of water she can make the water safe for her family to drink. In her
kitchen she has a special measuring spoon the health agent gave her to make a simple
solution of water, salt, and sugar to give to her child when he suffers from diarrhea.
She understands the benefits of breast-feeding instead of using powdered milk, and
her health agent reminds her to take her children for their vaccine shots, and, when
she is pregnant, to receive a tetanus shot and attend monthly prenatal appointments.
In the other Northeastern states where the PAS program does not exist, the
population rarely receives this type of support and information about their health. In
a Northeast town near Recife, for example, differing opinions among mothers about
how to treat an infant suffering from severe diarrhea exemplify the lack of
information and confusion about health and nutrition:
One woman recommended a different powdered-milk formula; another
suggested giving the infant a mashed banana; another disagreed, saying that
fresh fruit might kill a baby as fragile as this one. The women complained
that the local doctors disagree among themselves. Some said to withhold food
during an acute crisis of diarrhea, and others said to give food to the infant.
No one was sure; everyone was confused (Scheper-Hughes 1992:391).
In Ceard mothers recall that they too were once unsure about how to deal with
diarrhea. Whereas many mothers once withheld food from children with it, they now
know to feed them. When and from whom did they learn this information? Most
have learned it and other health information from monthly visits from one of their
neighbors trained as a health agent by a local nurse.
The Programa de Agente de Saide (PAS) began in 1987 as part of an
emergency employment program during a severe drought in Ceard. The program
functioned in the most severely hit municipios of the state's interior. It ended in 1988
when the drought ended, but was so well received that in 1989 the state sustained and
extended the program to all of Ceard's municpios except its capital Fortaleza, where
health facilities and medical professionals are more accessible to the poor population.
Table 2 shows PAS's evolution as a temporary emergency program in 1987 to the
current state-funded program. The agent-to-family ratio shows PAS's increasing
impact and importance on families in the state from 1987 to 1992. Although workers
were not paid in 1988 because the federal funding ended and the state program did
not yet begin, many health agents continued to visit homes and educate families,
demonstrating the program's popularity (See Appendix 2, Program Impact).
TABLE 2
GROWTH OF PAS FROM 1987 TO 1992
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF RATIO OF
HEALTH MUNICIPIOS FAMILIES AGENTS TO
AGENTS SERVED FAMILIES
(approx.) (5- member
family)
1987 6,113 128 600,000 1:130
1988# 150 4 15,000 1:5307
1989* 1,628 45 160,000 1:478
1990 3,433 102 340,000 1:216
1991 4,947 130 495,000 1:164
1992 7,227 177 800,000 1:112
# The program did not continue officially in 1988; however, roughly 150 health
agents continued working without pay.
* In 1989 the state re-initiated the program with state funds as part of a movement for
health reform in the state.
In Ceard's PAS program, more than 7,200 health agents currently visit the
roughly 800,000 families in the state's interior. With approximately 64% percent of
the state population living in the interior (4.1 million), each health agent is
responsible for between 80 and 225 households, averaging 112 families per agent.
Figure 1 illustrates the pyramid structure of the PAS program. At the bottom
are the 7,227 health agents who provide the health education. The state pays health
agents a minimum wage (US$2/day) to work eight hours a day in the munictpio where
they live. They report to nurse supervisors who typically work for and live in the
municipio in which they work. Municipios have between one and four part-time nurse
supervisors depending on the number of health agents, with a total of 225 supervisors
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FIGURE 1
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PAS
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in the state. On average, one nurse supervises 30 health agents, training, evaluating,
and managing them. Above the nurse supervisors are nine female state-hired program
coordinators who select the agents and administer the project from the State
Department of Health in Fortaleza.' The state's Secretary of Health oversees the
project. Each of the state's 14 administrative health regions has a regional supervisor
who is often the municipal Secretary of Health, or the supervisor of the largest
municipio in the given regions. Regional supervisors distribute supplies furnished by
the state, organize meetings on a regional basis and compile and send data collected
from supervisors in each region. UNICEF provides technical assistance to the
program coordinators.
Health agents visit between 10 and 15 homes daily; they must visit each family
once a month, and more often if there is a pregnant woman or children under five in
the household. The agents are between the ages of 18 and 45, and many are literate,
having achieved between a second and sixth grade education; 95% are females. The
health agents assume a preventive health role, and therefore carry no medicines
though they are trained to provide some simple curative treatments for minor cuts and
burns.7 Health agents undertake a variety of preventive health tasks:
'One of the nine (a nurse) supervises the other coordinators.
7All health agents carry a blue backpack with antiseptic cream, iodine, scissors to cut hair and fingernails, soap,
a comb, gauze, cotton, adhesive tape, a thermometer, oral rehydration solution packets, a measuring tape to monitor
the growth of babies and pregnant women, growth and immunization charts for children under five years, and a card
to record information about the household. This includes status of mother's breast-feeding, mother's prenatal care,
number of deaths and illnesses in the household, family's access to clean water, and the vaccination status of
domestic animals.
* make home visits and organize group meetings on health topics;
* refer people to the health centers for prenatal care, cancer prevention,
or severe illness or injury, and other health services;
* vaccinate or assist with vaccination campaigns against diphtheria,
tetanus, measles, polio, and tuberculosis;
* teach oral rehydration methods and water treatment to prevent
dehydration and diarrhea;
* instruct families about proper hygiene for infants and young children;
and
* monitor children's growth and encourage women to breast-feed and
undergo perinatal care.
Agents are unusually dedicated and hard working. Many start the day at 7:00
am, and work until after 5:00 pm, assisting people beyond their required daily eight
hours. Several times I arrived in a town and asked a store owner or local leader to
see the health agent. Within 15 minutes, she arrived on her bicycle ready to respond
to a request for assistance. The health agents know their nurse supervisors well.
They meet with them at least once a month, and rely on them for information and
problem-solving advice. The nurse supervisors organize monthly meetings and
training sessions for their agents. They regularly contact state coordinators to provide
them with data or seek advice and information, and the coordinators send supplies to
munic(pios on a systematic basis.
The seeming simplicity of the PAS program hides the complex mechanisms
behind its functioning. To select and manage 7,000 health agents throughout the state
requires a strong administrative unit. Keeping 177 municpios well supplied and
trained requires systematic planning, coordination, and a clear division of labor.
Agents must be well trained and supervised to pass on detailed information to families
day after day. The agents must have incentives, feel motivated enough and have the
energy to walk, bike, ride horseback, or canoe eight hours everyday. For the
program to be effective the community must accept the services and be willing to
learn. In turn, the agents must provide a valued service to gain acceptance from men
as well as women, to a point where they expect their monthly visits, and know how to
contact them when they need them. The program requires the cooperation of health
professionals to provide training and supervision of paraprofessionals, and of political
leaders to support the program.
All these requirements underscore complexities that most CHW programs have
had difficulty managing. Chapter 3 explains how, through political support gained at
the state level, the program scaled up and functioned well as a large state program.
3. SCALING UP:
FROM PILOT PROJECT TO STATE PROGRAM
The failures of CHW programmes can be attributed to inadequacies in their
planning and implementation. With notable exceptions, these programmes
have not received the support they need (WHO 1989).
Ceard is a perfect example of what can be done, even in the poorest regions,
when a competent and dedicated team gets complete support from their
government (Time May, 6 1991).
His commitment, prudence, and honesty convinced us he would support us
(Miriam Lavor, PAS co-founder, referring to Ceard's Governor Tasso
Jereissati, July, 1992).
The Programa de Agente de Sadde (PAS) began as a non-governmental, pilot
program in one of Ceard's munictpios and eventually became the largest state
community health worker (CHW) program in Brazil. The program's scaling-up
process is significant because in most countries small-scale CHW programs have
seldom successfully been turned into large-scale government programs (Wood 1984,
Walt et al. 1989).1 How did PAS accomplish this? The key to this process was that
the PAS founders envisioned it as a government program and part of a movement for
health reform in the state from its inception. Three factors that enabled them to link
PAS to government and scale up are:
1) through years of preparation they developed a clear concept of the role
of the health agent in Ceard;
2) they learned from various pioneer programs in Ceard', and benefitted
from these earlier efforts; and,
'See, for example, the Botswana case in Walt et al. (1990) where the transformation from a successful
small pilot scheme to a national program resulted in a less effective program. See also the Tanzania case
in Heggenhougen (1987) and the Guatemala case in Heggenhougen (1984).
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3) they lobbied intensely to gain support and legitimacy from the medical
profession, the community, and the state governor to implement the
state-wide program. (See Appendix 3, chronology of PAS)
3.1 PAS: Part of A Health Reform Movement
Many governments implement CHW programs to meet the broad goals of
primary health care: to make health care universally accessible and to involve the
community in identifying and solving its own health problems (WHO 1989, Wood
1984). A primary reason for PAS's success was that the program founders had
realistic expectations of what the program could accomplish in the state. They
envisioned PAS as a component of universal health care and community participation,
not as the entire solution. Indeed, they considered that the program could only be
universal, effective, and sustainable if two conditions were met: PAS had to be
linked to and funded by the public health system, and the health system had to be
structured to meet the needs of the population.
The PAS founders believed that without the support of the state health system,
the CHW program would lack access to the extended health services and information
which it needed to make the expected health impacts. They recognized that basing
the CHW program in the health system would legitimize the health agents because
their work needed to be supported by the system's professionals. The health agents
could refer patients to the formal health services when necessary, receive on-going
training, and influence the system by keeping the medical professionals informed
about general community needs. Finally, the founders did not expect PAS to solve all
of the state's health problem, but believed that, as part of a larger system, PAS would
contribute more effectively to improved health.
3.2 Self-Learning and Learning and Benefitting from Pioneers
The decision to link PAS to the government as part of a larger movement for
health reform did not evolve immediately, but rather through much preparation,
learning, and benefitting from personal experience and other CHW efforts and
experiences. The PAS founders moved into decision-making positions within the
state government and were ultimately able to implement PAS as a full-scale
government program.
The following story describes the determination and charisma of a married
couple, born and educated in Ceard, who dedicated their careers to developing
solutions to their state's severe health problems. This story is significant in that we
seldom learn about the origins of major political movements, whether they are
institutional or governmental. Furthermore, the importance of this story is not the
couple's energy and determination in and of itself, but their linkage to a larger
movement both internationally and within Ceard that supported their efforts and
sustained their cause.
Carlile Lavor, a physician, and his wife, Miriam, a sociologist, both born in
rural Ceard and educated there, were disturbed by the high infant death rate and the
lack of basic health care in their state. They were determined to reach the poor in
remote areas with preventive health care services and information. They researched
CHW schemes throughout the developing world and were particularly influenced by
China's successful "barefoot doctors", a program in which CHWs are spread
throughout China to provide basic preventive and curative health services to the
underserved rural populations. In particular, two features of China's model stood out
for them: the "barefoot doctors" were integrated into China's medical system, and the
Chinese government strongly supported the program. They decided that Ceard could
benefit from a similar program.
In the 1960s formal health services in Ceard's interior were virtually non-
existent, clinics were sparse and medical personnel scanty. This made it impractical
for the Lavors to test out their ideas there. They moved to Brasilia which had a more
advanced public health care system and implemented a small CHW program in a town
outside of Brasilia. They worked there for ten years with families and medical
personnel to encourage community participation in health and self-improvement.
In the late 1970s, a time when most developing nations formally recognized
primary health care and the CHW scheme as a means to reduce high morbidity and
mortality, the couple traveled to several countries in South America to learn about
other CHW programs. Influenced by the international recognition of primary health
care, in 1979 they returned to their hometown of Jucds, Ceard and trained community
members to use UNICEF's GOBI technique (Growth monitoring, Oral rehydration,
Breast-feeding, and Immunization), which had already become widely used in CHW
programs throughout the developing world.
The Lavors' experience in Brasilia and their exposure to international
programs did not entirely prepare them to deal with the severe health conditions in
Ceard, however, Miriam Lavor noted that "We walked into people's homes, their
babies' heads were black with oozing sores, and most suffered from diarrhea. The
general hygiene was so poor that we realized the population would benefit by starting
with basic information and care." Thus, she determined, in addition to performing
the GOBI techniques, the health agents would carry scissors to cut children's hair and
fingernails, and soap to wash infants. The health agents in Jucds, earned a small
wage with funding from the state agency, FUNABEM, Fundagao Bemestar do Menor
(Children's Welfare Fund). The dozen agents learned rapidly to teach oral
rehydration and breastfeeding and worked diligently. After several years, as health
improvements became noticeable, the Lavors were ready to expand the program. Yet
before garnering the political support necessary to scale up the program, they had
more learning to do: this time from other CHW programs within Ceard.
The Lavors found that CHW programs had existed in Ceard since the 1940s.
Table 3 shows that, like PAS, all of these programs teach community members to
provide preventive health care, mostly to young mothers and children. The Lavors
learned from the strengths and weaknesses of these earlier programs, adopting the
successful aspects and taking alternative approaches to strengthen the impact and
efficacy of the PAS program.
TABLE 3
COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKER PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT CEARA
PROGRAM FSESP PROIAS-VIVA PASTORAL PROGRAMA
Programs DE CRIANCA DE AGENTE
DE SAUDE
(PAS)
FUNDING Federal Federal Catholic Ceard
Government university, Church government
Project Hope,
AID, and UNICEF**
Kellogg
Foundation
Funding
BEGUN 1942 1975 1982 1987
WORKER Visitadora Traditional Volunteer Health Agent
Healers Leader
MAIN TASKS Provide child Retrained to Provide GOBI, Provide
OF WORKER and maternal perform safe and religious GOBI house to
health info. in birthing messages house#
health posts methods, house to
GOBI# house#
SALARY less than 1/2 minim. no pay minimum wage
minimum wage to CHW
wage
SIZE
Number of 38 26 69 177
municipios
CHW per 3-4 N/A 5-9 20-130
municipios ---- --- ----- ---------
502 TBAs*
Number of 130 workers 167 THs* 500 workers 7,227 agents
workers 80 CHWs
(749 total)
* THs, TBAs - Catholic healers and traditional birth attendants, or midwives.
** UNICEF provides technical assistance
# GOBI- Growth monitoring, oral rehydration, breast-feeding and immunization.
An important difference between PAS and the Special Public Health Services
Foundation (FSESP)2 is that PAS emphasizes home visits of health agents while
FSESP does not. FSESP trains community members to vaccinate and provide basic
curative and preventive care, and the FSESP agents (visitadoras) spend most of their
time in health posts. In contrast, the Lavors realized that because many people lacked
both time and transportation to visit health centers, and because many distrusted the
health services, health agents would reach more people and be more effective by
visiting homes. In addition, FSESP pays its health workers less than a minimum
wage while PAS raises the status of its workers by paying one full minimum wage.
Currently the PAS health agents spend 90% of their time visiting roughly 72,270
homes every day (about 800,000 families).
PAS differs in two important ways from Ceard's largest non-governmental
child and maternal health program, Pastoral da Crianga (Child's Commission). PAS
pays its health agents and, health agents provide no religious information. Supported
by the Catholic Church, the Pastoral da Crianga began throughout Brazil in 1982.
Nuns in each municipio supervise the program and engage nurses who train volunteer
community members to perform the same tasks as PAS health agents. Unlike PAS,
however, the program includes Catholic teaching, and the use of herbal medicines and
alternative foods. The Lavors wanted PAS information to be free from religious
messages. The Lavors also decided they would give health agents full-time paid
2FSESP (known as SESP Special Service of Public Health before 1960) was Brazil's first public health
effort. It was established by the U.S. government during World War II to improve health conditions of
the work-force employed in extracting raw materials for the war effort (Horn 1985:49) The FSESP
program concentrates its efforts in Northeast, Brazil.
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employment to reward their work. As Table 3 shows, the 7,227 PAS health agents
working eight hours per day visit far more families than the roughly 500 volunteers
from Pastoral da Crianga who work one or two hours per day. Research findings
showing that voluntary programs have high attrition rates and limited sustainability,
make a strong case for paying health workers (Walt 1988, WHO 1987). Most CHWs
earn a small wage from either their government or fee-for-service from beneficiaries.
The PAS program also differs from the third program, the Integrated Primary
Health Care Program (Programa de Agoes Integradas de Sade - PROIAS) which
emphasizes using religious healers. Nearly 85 % of the people in Ceari rely on
traditional healers such as midwives, Catholic healers, and herbalists to deliver
infants, perform spiritual ceremonies to eradicate disease, and prepare herbal teas and
homemade remedies (Nations 1989). Because of this, the director of the University
Maternal Hospital in Ceard founded PROIAS to retrain existing traditional healers to
provide preventive health information. In 1985 Project Hope, a USAID-supported
non-profit organization collaborated with PROIAS to teach traditional healers to
incorporate oral rehydration therapy into their practice.3 The program also trains
roughly 80 community health workers (four/community) to provide health education.
The Lavors, nevertheless, viewed the health worker as someone who should be
able to relate to both traditional and modern medicine and to provide information free
of religious or spiritual messages. While PAS does not prohibit the use of traditional
3Mis program was carried out by two medical anthropologists, Marilyn Nations from the University
of Virginia, and Maria Auxiliadora de Sousa, Chief of the Anthropology Department of the Federal
University of Ceari.
healers, the program attracts many women who have not previously been involved in
healing, and gives priority to those candidates who are literate, below the age of 45,
and physically capable of biking or walking eight hours per day. These requirements
eliminate many Catholic healers, although some midwives are health agents.4
My field research provided other observations about the traditional system as
compared to PAS. While traditional medicine has important lessons for modem
practitioners, and while many medical anthropologists rightly elucidate the value of
traditional methods, religious traditional medicine has significantly influenced people's
values, knowledge, and behavior regarding the origins and treatment of disease.
Anthropologists seldom point out the possible drawbacks of traditional healers in
limiting people's questioning of disease.
Healers who use Catholic teaching as the base for their practice reinforce
people's sense of powerlessness to control disease by making God responsible for
illness. Because people believe disease is something over which they have limited
control, they do not question its possible origins or their power over their own health
conditions. For example, I found that often a woman would interpret her baby's
diarrhea as God's will and therefore out of her control. When I asked women how
many children they wanted they consistently replied, "however many God wants."
The inability to control one's health is reinforced by Catholic healers who "cure"
people through mysticism and "God's powers."
4I do not have the percentage of midwives working as health agents. In all the munic pios I visited,
I found a few midwives employed as health agents. In my interviews I learned that midwives are highly
respected and valued by the community, health agents, and nurses.
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Also, teaching traditional healers to incorporate health tasks into their
repertoire reinforces the mystification of a simple, non-mystical procedure. For
example, when traditional healers teach oral rehydration therapy they perform rituals
which add a level of mysticism to a simple procedure. The health agents, in contrast,
provide direct information that is not spiritual or complicated. Furthermore, agents
don't provide religious explanations for disease. They engage people in discussing
the lack of public services, inadequate housing, the food deficiency, and other issues
that affect people's health conditions. While this observation requires further
investigation, my field experience indicated that the PAS program's non-religious
approach may lead people to better understand and control their own health.5
For the Lavors, the precursor programs introduced the CHW concept to
Ceard, provided lessons for the PAS program, and paved the way for implementing
the state program. The earlier programs boosted the acceptance of PAS by the
government, medical professionals and the general population. They demonstrated
the importance of primary health care to reduce illness and death. They also laid the
groundwork to prepare medical professionals and the general community to accept
paraprofessional care. According to the head administrator of PROIAS, doctors
initially criticized training paraprofessionals to provide even basic health care. He
recalls that this criticism dissipated as doctors saw the benefits of CHW work.
5Heggenhougen and Gilson (1992) use examples from Tanzania to show that people's health needs are
quite complicated and unpredictable and that they will often use multiple sources ranging from Western to
traditional medicine to treat illness.
Another benefit of the earlier small-scale programs was that their
administrators generously offered their expertise. For example, when the Secretary of
Health first implemented PAS he and his staff met with leaders of PROIAS and
Pastoral da Crianga for advice and to exchange information. He set the stage for
open communication and cooperation. As a result, PAS uses the same means of data
collection as Pastoral da Crianga. These programs also provided a pool of trained
and experienced health workers for PAS to draw upon.
Yet one question is left unanswered. Given that these programs still exist and
have been successful on a small scale in the state for many years, why was it PAS
and not one of them that scaled up to become a large state-wide program? The next
section answers this question.
3.3 Linking to Government
Often health professionals or political leaders implement ad hoc programs to
make up for the shortcomings of inappropriate or inaccessible health services and do
not link the program to the local government-based health system. While many health
professionals agreed that Ceard needed a reformed health system that provides basic
health care, they did not believe that the government could initiate change. Thus,
rather than pressuring government to improve the inefficient public health system,
they established non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as PROIAS and
Pastoral da Crianga. Because these are based in financially-constrained voluntary
institutions, however, they lack the capacity to scale up. Furthermore, the NGO
program administrators firmly believed they would lose quality control if their
programs grew, and were linked to a large, bureaucratic government system. As
described in section 3.1, PAS founders were unusual in that they envisioned the
government as the program's institutional home.
After 20 years of experimenting and learning, the Lavors decided on a rather
radical strategy to garner the government support they needed to implement a state-
wide CHW program. They became politically active. The approach of the 1985
gubernatorial election provided an opportunity to interest Tasso Jereissati, a candidate
for governor, in their ideas about health reform and the CHW program. Their
support for him was ajogo nofogo ("shot in the dark") (interview with Miriam
Lavor, July 1992) because they did not know him and were not certain of his
intentions. His slogan Movimento Pro Mudangas ("Movement For Change") and his
representing the modern urban industrial model rather than the traditional rural elite
paralleled their own hopes for Ceard. Furthermore, they knew the other candidates,
all Coronets (the rural elite that dominated state politics) would be unsupportive.
One of the most important strategies they used to gain Jereissati's support was
to elicit backing from medical professionals in Ceard'. Every weekend, Dr. Lavor
traveled 14 hours by bus from Jucds to Fortaleza and back to build a coalition. The
coalition began with six doctors, all committed to building preventive health care
throughout the state. They would continue to work for years as a team to push for
state health reform. The Lavors' linkage to other progressive, highly motivated
medical professionals throughout the state demonstrates that their efforts were not
isolated, but rather, part of a larger movement for health reform in the state. Three
of the original six doctors, including Dr. Lavor, eventually became Secretary of
Health for the state.
The team of six doctors soon grew to over 200 health professionals including
nurses, social workers, and other health professionals who formed a council for
Jereissati's campaign. The council agreed that the current health system was not
improving the state's health conditions or responding to the real needs of the poor.
They endeavored to shift decision-making control over health spending from the
federal to the state and eventually to the municipal level to make health services more
responsive and accessible to the population. The health agent program was
considered an important component of this effort to decentralize health to more
appropriately meet the population's needs and avoid slow bureaucratic decision-
making at higher government levels.
Because medical professionals are highly visible and influential in
communities, they helped Tasso Jereissati win the election. In appreciation, the new
governor appointed Dr. Lavor as Secretary of Health. With support and advice from
both the governor and members of the council, he initiated two changes. First, he
initiated a movement to decentralize health services.' Second, he created an
educational program to increase awareness about the importance of primary health
care among the population and health professionals.
6In August, 1992, 88 of the state's 178 municipios were decentralized.
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The push for decentralized services actually began at the national level, as a
larger movement for health reform in Brazil beyond Ceard. Dr. Lavor and the
governor joined a national Public Health Movement (Movimento Sanitarista) with
other reformers (mostly doctors) throughout the country to universalize health services
and decentralize the system. Under the national plan, health funds from payroll-based
social security and other government revenue would be transferred from the federal to
the state government, instead of federal government distributing funds directly to
health centers from the federal level. The plan:
1) allowed people to have most of their medical problems resolved at the
nearest health or clinic instead of having to use high-cost hospitals;
2) unified and reallocated resources in favor of more cost-effective
preventive services and simple curative services at the non-hospital
level, and;
3) opened up the health care system, making it free of charge to all
persons, irrespective of whether they are employed or affiliates of the
social security system.
With pressure from governors and medical professionals throughout Brazil, in mid-
1987 the federal government launched the health reform agenda, and by 1988 it was
officially added to Brazil's 1988 constitution (Melo 1992).
Although this federal initiative prompted other state's to decentralize their
services, no state in the Northeast was as committed to reform as Ceard. Dr. Lavor
prepared Ceard for the PAS program by initiating a reorganization of the health
delivery system. He merged health organizations that were performing duplicate tasks
and gave local community leaders increased decision-making power over the health
spending in their municipios. He required that each munic"pio appoint a Secretary of
Health, allocate 10% of its own local budget to health, and establish a health council
based on popular participation. The health council, led by the municipio's Secretary
of Health, was to decide how to spend the health budget. The PAS improves this
system by keeping people educated about health, and maintaining a flow of
information within the population.
The state governments' second initiative was to raise awareness among the
population and medical professionals about the importance of primary health care. In
1987, the state launched Viva Crianga (Long Live the Child) which continues today.
The state government lobbied corporations to fund the program which 1) organizes
primary health care (PHC) television and radio campaigns, and 2) provides PHC
training to medical personnel to increase vaccination and oral rehydration therapy.
The governor convinced the state's medical schools to require students to take courses
with Viva Crianga medical staff before taking their medical board exams, to learn to
incorporate preventive health care techniques into their own practice.
The educational campaign serves PAS in two ways. First, it underscores the
importance of primary health care, legitimizing the health agents when they visit
families. Second, the campaigns strengthen support from the medical community by
making primary health care an important component of health care.
This decentralization process and the educational campaigns prepared the state
for the PAS program, and in March 1987 the governor included the Program de
Agente de Saade in the Governor's State Plan. One complication inhibited beginning
the program, however; the state couldn't afford it.
3.4 Seizing Opportunity Through Drought Emergency
After his election, Tasso faced serious economic problems and fired roughly
40,000 (27%), mostly "phantom" civil servants, 7 of the 150,000 employed by the
state. These sharp budget cuts made it inappropriate to hire between 5,000 and 7,000
health agents required to work in all of the state's municpios. Thus, to continue
experimenting with his model, Dr. Lavor set up a small health agent program in
Fortaleza and trained low-level state employees, mostly state hospital aides and
cleaning staff, as health agents. This meant that additional funds were not required to
pay them.
In 1987, a severe drought hit Ceari, causing high unemployment and increased
incidence of malnutrition and diarrhea, especially in the rural interior of the state. In
response to these conditions, the federal government allocated funds to Ceard for one
year to employ approximately 200,000 of the poorest people (roughly 5% of the
state's interior) in infrastructure jobs for approximately half a minimum wage
(US$1.50/ day). 8
Because drought is common in Ceard, the emergency employment scheme was
not new. For years the federal government had transferred funds to employ
temporarily the poorest to construct small dams, reservoirs, bridges, roads, and other
7For years prior to 1985, state governors employed hundreds, perhaps thousands of "phantom" workers
to retain additional finances at the state level to use at their discretion.
'It is unclear what health agents actually earned during the emergency employment scheme. In
interviews, respondents claimed to have earned half the minimum wage; documents state that the wage was
the full minimum wage (Carneiro Tel6s 1988).
construction jobs.' But during this emergency the state broke with tradition in two
ways. First, the state implemented a health project as part of the employment
program. This temporary "boom" in funding, the increased health risks of the
drought, and the readiness of the Secretary of Health to implement a health worker
program, made implementing the PAS program a prudent decision. The governor
allocated a portion of the federal money to employ roughly 6,000 health agents in the
118 municipios most severely hit by the drought.
Second, the state employed women on a wide scale in an emergency program
that historically gave priority to men. The governor and Dr. Lavor agreed that
employing primarily women as health agents was appropriate given that most of the
information and services they provide are for women and children. They were
further justified in employing women because as Dr. Lavor noted, "women really are
the poorest of the poor, and the purpose of the emergency program was to employ the
poorest." This decision set the precedent for employing mostly women as health
agents in the sustained program, and partly answers the question: how could the state
justify employing women at a wage that exceeds many men's wages in the interior?
In general, while program administrators worldwide often prefer to employ women as
health workers (because their central tasks are to inform women and children), some
programs employ mostly men for several reasons. In some cultures it is unacceptable
for women to work outside the home. The task requires some literacy and in some
regions few women are literate. Some tasks may require hard labor such as building
9See Wade (1993) for a complete description and analysis of Ceard's drought emergency program.
42
latrines or sewer systems. In Ceard, however, the nature of the health worker's task,
the general acceptance of women working outside the home, and because the literacy
rate in Ceard is higher among women (50%) than men (40%) (PSSNB 1991), the
obstacles to hiring females in other CHW programs did not exist in Ceard. The
temporary program established an example for accepting female health agents, so
when the state re-initiated the program in 1989 with its own funding, most of the
women were already in place as health agents.
3.5 Pressure to Continue PAS
During the temporary emergency program, the health agents visited families at
least once a month to provide information about pre-natal care, breast-feeding, oral
rehydration therapy, and vaccination. Health conditions improved noticeably, and the
population reacted positively to the program. Medical professionals and community
members relate that with oral rehydration therapy and increased breast-feeding, the
incidence of diarrhea decreased and fewer children were dying. When the
emergency program ended in 1988 the community0 reacted strongly. They asked
local politicians and health personnel (mainly council representatives, nurses and
social workers) why the program ended and whether it would continue.
10I refer to the "community" often throughout this study. It should be noted that communities, by
nature, are not monolithic. Not all community members share common interests, beliefs and needs,
although they may share living space and are subject to laws of the same government. In discussing actions
or beliefs of the "community," I refer to the general picture I formed from my interviews and observations
in a given munic pio or area.
Pressure of this kind is unusual. According to Tendler (1982), projects such
as irrigation or electricity, which have a conspicuous physical structure with clear
impacts on producer incomes, consistently garner more community support than less
visible social programs such as nutrition, basic sanitation, or health. For example,
recipients of prenatal care may never realize that it resulted in a safe pregnancy.
Because the benefits of such care are not apparent, they are unlikely to pressure for
the program's continuation. Another reason social programs are less valued by the
community is that they tend to improve conditions in the household (the female
domain in most countries) while production-generating activities benefit income (the
male domain). In most countries, the productive activity of men is considered more
important than women's non-productive activities.
Because of high unemployment during the drought, the emergency jobs were
highly valuable and therefore visible throughout the state. Thus, when the emergency
program began, the problem with PAS was not visibility, but gaining the acceptance
of the beneficiaries. Many people associated health agents with the often hostile and
burdensome health system; they did not trust the health agents' advice and resisted
them. Health agents reported that many families refused to let them in or would hide
their children when they came. People would ignore the agents' advice to use oral
rehydration therapy or immunize their children. They reasoned that because no one
in their family was vaccinated, and they survived, that their children need not be
vaccinated either.
Gaining the community's trust was the most difficult initial task for the agents.
One agent remembers the resistance, but says she kept pushing. "I continued to go
house to house even when the doors slammed on me. From my training, I could see
how important the information was. Besides, I was paid to educate people." A few
families accepted them, and soon others began to see the direct benefits of using oral
rehydration therapy. When the newly vaccinated babies did not die immediately from
a common ailment, the word spread quickly that the agents' advice improved things.
Another important factor in gaining community support was that agents
provided comfort and assistance to lonely and overburdened mothers. Because they
visited homes during the day when the mother was there with young children, agents
would sometimes assist with the cooking or cleaning. The agent was a source of
solace to mothers who would often share her problems with the agent. One mother I
interviewed recalled that;
Veronica (health agent) has been coming to our house for five years. I expect
and look forward to her visits. She shares important information with me
about my family's health and nutrition, and sometimes she gives me a hand
preparing meals or with my little ones. She is a true friend, and has done
more for us than she will ever realize.
The program's rapid results in health improvements, and the compassionate style of
the health agents increased the community's acceptance of the program, and made
families feel they now had a right to the agents' information and assistance. Because
the emergency PAS program existed for a year in over 70% of the state's munici'pios,
a majority of the state's communities became convinced of its importance and lobbied
the government to continue it. This pressure to continue PAS is unique considering,
as mentioned earlier, that communities seldom push for health projects.
3.6 Instituting the PAS Program
He [Governor Tasso Jereissatil could have chosen, after all, to implement a
sanitation project, but the engineers were not prepared. The doctors were. It
was simply our readiness that swept our program into the state plans (Dr.
Carlile Lavor, July 1992).
The state made PAS a permanent program in 1989. It was the only
employment project that continued after the emergency program ended. Community
pressure was not the only factor that convinced the governor to re-initiate the program
with state funds. He was also persuaded by the rapid results and the low cost. The
PAS program, at $1 per capita per year, was improving health conditions more
swiftly than the country's centralized health care system which cost more than $80 per
capita (McGreevey 1988.)" (See Appendix 4, program cost.)
To quickly establish the temporary program in 1987, the state set up an
innovative selection process to prevent local politicians from selecting health agents
for their own political interests. To choose the health agents in each munic(pio an
agricultural extension agent and a member of a local community action group (GACs,
1McGreevey (1988) says that Brazilian experts differ in their estimates of public and private health
spending, ranging from 3.9% to 4.3% of GDP. He uses figures that estimate that health care costs would
reach $12 billion by 1987. The total cost of the program is roughly $6,000,000 per year.
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Grupo de Agdo Comunitdrio)12 organized the community to choose the poorest
unemployed people, and the GACs then selected the health agents. Coordinators
recall that during the emergency, "Although the selection with the GACs was set up
to be fair, and participatory, the mayors still exerted tremendous influence over the
process." For the permanent program in 1989, the governor and Secretary of Health
modified this process.
TABLE 4
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EMERGENCY PROGRAM
AND THE STATE-FUNDED PROGRAM
1987 1989
Emergency Program State Program
Funding Federal government State government
Supervision Dependent on volunteer doctors, Nurses hired in munictpios where
nurses, social workers, dentists. no nurse existed.
Selection Health agents selected by GACs* Health Agents selected by
with community input coordinating team with minimal
community input
Training 15 days 3 months with on-going training
Tasks Tasks limited to oral rehydration Same as Emergency Program, but
therapy, vaccination, and also growth monitoring, water
breastfeeding treatment, prenatal care, charts
Additions Uniforms, different modes of
transport: bicycles, donkeys,
canoes
* GACs - Community Action Group (Grupo de Agdo Comunitdrio)
2The GACs comprised 12 representatives from the mayor's office, city council, service clubs, religious
organizations, rural worker's union, the state agricultural extension agency, and the municipal secretaries
of health, education and social action. See Wade (1993) for a full description of the GACs.
Table 4 outlines some of the differences in funding, selection, supervision, and
training between the temporary emergency program and the permanent state program.
Instead of having the GACs select the health agents, the Secretary of Health assigned
five nurses and social workers" already employed by the state Secretary of Health to
coordinate the program at the state level and select health agents based on their skill,
enthusiasm, and potential to educate their neighbors. When the permanent program
started all of the 6,113 health agents selected by the GACs during the emergency had
to go through the new selection process with the coordinating team to be considered.
Supervision also changed. During the emergency, supervision was precarious.
The coordinators traveled throughout the munic"pios to motivate dentists, doctors,
nurses, or social workers who lived in the municipios to volunteer to train health
agents for two weeks, and supervise their work. Once the governor sustained the
program, each munic(pios was required to hire a nurse to supervise and train health
agents which, as explained in the next chapter, had a significant impact on PAS.
Lessons from the emergency program helped the governor and Secretary of
Health find ways to reduce political patronage, increase professionalism and
commitment of workers, and led to a uniquely structured government program. State
employed health professionals oversee and administer the program and employ the
health agents, but the municipios employ the agents' supervisors. We now turn to
explore why this cooperation between governments has worked so well.
'he Lavors decided to include both nurses and social workers as program coordinators to give the
program a balanced, interdisciplinary nature.
4. SUCCESSFUL FEATURES OF PAS
The transition from the temporary program to the sustained program was not
completely smooth. In order to implement PAS during a time when he was making the
largest budget cuts in the state's history, the governor had to make some compromises. In
the first section of this chapter I describe how financial constraints at the state level required
him to assign partial responsibility for the program to local government. This division of
responsibility between the state and municipal governments, while emerging from constraints,
made the program more manageable and less bureaucratic. I then describe other features of
PAS and how they have contributed to worker performance and/or avoided problems
common in other CHW programs. They are: the selection process, the support of
paraprofessionals by professionals, the use of curative care, and the program's data collection
process.
4.1 Divided Responsibility With Municiios
To retain complete control over PAS, the state Secretary of Health wanted the
program coordinators, supervisors, and health agents to be state government employees.
Financial constraints, however, compelled the governor to request that the munic(pios employ
some of the staff. The nurse supervisors and health agents constituted the greatest program
cost (see appendix 4). The governor was willing to assume 85% (approximately US$5.2
million) of the program cost by paying for the health agents' salaries and supplies, but
requested that the municipios assume 15% (roughly US$800,000) of the program cost by
employing the nurses to supervise the health agents. The program coordinators were already
state employees and posed no additional expenditure.
The governor's decision was based on three reasons. First, employing one or two
nurses is less of a cost burden for financially weak munic(pios than employing between 30
and 150 health agents.1 Second, the state wanted to retain complete control over the
selection process of agents to prevent mayors from employing health agents for political
purposes, or in exchange for political favors. Third, as state employees the state evaluates
the agents' work on criteria determined by the state government and applied to all health
agents in each municipio.
Before implementing PAS, the state first had to convince the mayors to endorse the
program in their municfpios. Fully 70% of the municipios had no nurses, and mayors had to
hire one if they wanted the program since the state would only hire health agents to work in
a municipio with a nurse to supervise them. Securing local support was not simple.
A few mayors accepted responsibility for the program because of its potential to
improve health conditions in their town. Many mayors, however, resisted the program for
various reasons. Some claimed they never needed a nurse in their munictpio in the past and
that they had no funds to hire one. Others resisted the program for political reasons. For
example, mayors from political parties other than the governor's suspected that he intended
to use health agents as lobbyists to canvass for his political party. Others feared that because
the health agents engage people in communication and assembled them for meetings, that
1 Nurses' pay ranges from roughly US$200 to US$500 per month. Some mayors pay high wages because they
value medical professionals. In most instances, however, the only way to persuade a nurse to work in a distant
munic pio in the middle of Ceard is to pay her well.
their efforts could force mayors to provide services they had successfully avoided providing
in the past. For instance, residents might pressure mayors to provide water connections, or
latrines once they realized the high incidence of diarrhea is due to contaminated water. To
convince recalcitrant mayors of the program's value required that PAS coordinators meet
with each individually.
All the mayors eventually accepted the program (although some mayors did not hire
a nurse for three years) because it offered to employ 30 to 150 people in their municipios,
thereby decreasing unemployment and bringing new income into their towns. They also
realized PAS would provide a service to their people for which they could take credit.
Additionally, because health agents do not distribute medicine, they do not threaten many
mayors' powerful roles as distributors of medicine (see section 2). Popular pressure was the
ultimate reason all the mayors eventually accepted the program in their towns. As the
program began functioning in some municipios, people in towns without the program wanted
the same services.
4.2 Influence Over Skilled Labor
The state's financial constraint and firmness to make the selection process of health
agents free from political manipulation by mayors compelled the state to give the municipios
control over the skilled labor of professional nurse supervisors as opposed to the unskilled
labor of health agents.2 This situation should raise concern for an important reason:
2Not only are mayors excluded from selecting health agents, but nurse supervisors are not permitted to
participate either. This is to avoid possible pressure from mayors on the nurse to choose certain people.
Supervisors are permitted to assist with the selection of agents outside their own municipio, and this often occurs.
supervision is one of the weakest aspects of CHW programs worldwide (Walt et al. 1989,
Gilson et al. 1989). In Ceard, the state exercises minimal regulation over one of the most
important aspects of the program. The weakness of PAS supervision has to do with the
mayor's influence to make it easier or more difficult for the supervisor to carry out her tasks
depending on how much he invests in the program. The few formal studies on CHW
supervision attribute poor supervision to minimal time spent supervising (Valadez, Vargas &
Diprete 1990, Desai & McCaw 1987). Inadequate supervision time is related to cost.
Supervision is often 40% of the program cost and when financial constraints arise,
administrators frequently cut costs by decreasing supervision time. In the PAS program, the
mayors' willingness to pay supervisors well, hire enough supervisors, and provide needed
services affects program supervision.
For example, most mayors hire only one nurse to work at the health center and expect
her to use her remaining time to supervise the health agents. This often leaves her fewer
than four hours of supervision per day, and limited time to carry out all her essential tasks
such as individually evaluating 30 to 150 agents every month, ordering and distributing
supplies and salaries, filling out and sending evaluation sheets to Fortaleza, organizing
meetings with agents, and providing agents with on-going training. The mayor can place
further restrictions on the supervisors' already constrained time by giving the supervisor
additional work in the health center, eliminating time for PAS supervision, or by not
providing them with transportation to visit the field.
Conversely, when the mayor increases the number of supervisors, equips them with
transportation, or hires an assistant to undertake the time-consuming administrative tasks,
supervisors have time to train and evaluate agents in the field. In one munictpio I visited,
the mayor hired only two supervisors for 123 health agents, but added an assistant to fill out
the data charts, a time consuming responsibility. This gave the supervisors more time to
review the information, meet with each agent individually, and visit agents in the field.
An example demonstrates how sufficient time can improve program performance. In
one municipio the mayor hired five nurse supervisors for 135 health agents thus enabling
them to make field visits. On one such field visit, I accompanied the supervisor assisted the
agent in treating a child's wound and asked her "Why would you not be able to give this boy
stitches?" The agent responded, "Because he would need anesthesia." As the agent worked,
the supervisor continued to ask a series of questions such as, "What do you do if the wound
does not heal properly? How many days should he wear this bandage, and when should you
change it?" On another visit with the health agent, the supervisor talked to the health agent
and mother about tetanus as they together showed the 16 year old mother how to wash her
two month infant. As they traveled together from house to house, the agent admitted to her
supervisor that she could visit only ten houses on most days. The supervisor said, "You
should continue to do quality work and not worry about rushing from house to house, you're
doing great." The agent glowed. This type of encouragement and valuable training
reinforces health agents in their work, but is seldom possible in municlpios where mayors put
limits on the supervisor's time.
While the mayors control some aspects of program performance, their control is also
limited to some degree. Interestingly, the large number of health programs that operate
simultaneously throughout the state place a check on the mayors' discretionary powers.
Because health agents, supervisors, and the community in one municipio know about
activities in surrounding towns, they may demand the same level of attention and resources
provided to their neighbors. In one municfpio, agents pressured their mayor to buy chlorine
for them because they learned of the cholera campaign in nearby munic(pios. The mayor
avoided buying the chlorine for several months, but increased pressure by health agents and
the supervisor eventually forced him to purchase it and initiate a campaign. Although there
are some negative consequences of dividing the responsibility for the program between two
levels of government, the next section describes why this division of labor may be one of the
most important explanations for the program's good performance.
4.3 Scaling-Out To 177 Programs
Health planners find that CHW programs are more successfully administered on a
small scale because they better meet program objectives of using a participatory process,
reaching a target population, and using innovative techniques at low cost (Streefland &
Chowdhury 1990). In general, researchers find that NGOs are more responsive to the needs
of a specific population like the elderly or battered women for example. (Lipsky and Smith
1989).3 Yet NGOs often lack the financial and institutional capacity to assume the high cost
and administrative demands of a large-scale CHW program. In contrast, governments can
often shoulder the administrative burdens of a large scale program, but are often
inappropriate to administrator CHW programs because, their central management and top-
3Several researchers challenge these conventional views about NGOs as participatory, "bottom-up," innovative,
and better suited to target a specific population. The findings show that often these characteristics falsely describe
NGOs. (Tendler 1982, Van Wicklin 1987, Kramer 1981)
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down approach can make administrators insensitive to local needs. This results in lost
program objectives.
The unique division of labor between Ceard and its municipios shows how a
government can manage a large-scale CHW program and still meet its objectives as a small-
scale project similar to an NGO. The PAS program solved this dilemma because instead of
scaling up from a pilot project to a single, centrally administered, large-scale program, in
effect, PAS scaled out into small manageable programs in each of the state's 177 municipios
that respond to needs unique to each locality.
With PAS the division of labor corresponds with the comparative strengths of both
levels of government. The state assumes responsibility for the costly and bureaucratic tasks
required of a large-scale program (such as selecting health agents, distributing supplies and
paychecks, and recording data collected by health agents). Munic(pios are responsible for
their own supervisors and their autonomy enables them to respond rapidly to local needs.
In practice, the coordinators instruct nurse supervisors during a two-day orientation in
Fortaleza where they learn to evaluate their agents every month, send data into the state,
conduct an initial eight weeks of didactic training and four weeks of field work with the
health agents, initiate on-going training sessions, and undertake other administrative tasks.
Beyond these requirements, the nurse supervisors freely decide about the agents' tasks and
training.4 Some nurse supervisors teach health agents to provide family planning
4The training of health agents is critical to program performance. Although I spoke at length with health agents,
supervisors, and coordinators about the training process, I did not observe a training session, and therefore am
unable to describe in great depth the process.
information, while others train agents to vaccinate, and still others emphasize group meetings
rather than individual consultation. In one municfpio, where cholera was a principal
problem, the supervisors spent time teaching agents about chlorinating, filtering, and boiling
water, and using proper hygiene when handling food. In contrast, in another municipio
where flu had been a prevailing problem, they emphasized educating the population about
this more pressing issue. Giving autonomy to nurses at the local level allows them to be
innovative, proactive, and to create a personal supervisory style that works best for them.
The freedom to make decisions about what agents do is important and allows them to adapt
the program to address the most pressing local needs, not addressed by the tasks of the state
program. For example, a central concern among women that I interviewed was controlling
family size. Most women initially said they wanted as many children as God granted them,
but would ultimately admit that they only wanted two or three. Although family planning is
not a component of the state program, mayors and supervisors in some munictpios have made
the provision of family planning information an important task of health agents.5
Another benefit of the program structure is that by giving autonomy to local
supervisors to identify and respond to local needs, PAS fosters cohesiveness among the
agents, which helps them carry out their role as agents of change. The concept of being an
agent of change is central to the entire PAS program. It comes from the Lavors, who
considered Ceard to have a repressive political environment and believed that many of the
'The leading method of birth control in Ceard is female sterilization, and currently 38% of the women undergo
tubal ligations (PSSFN 1991). A few women (13%) take contraceptive pills (PSSFN 1991), but only limited
consultation accompanies the distribution of the pill. In a municipio with no family planning information, one
woman told me that she takes a pill every time she has a sexual liaison. She didn't realize that the method is only
effective if she takes the pill every day at the same time. "Anyway, the thing costs me $cr1O,000 (about $2) per
pack, so I can't afford to spend that every month."
severe health problems in their state were rooted in socio-economic inequalities. In this
light, they envisioned a role of the health agent as an agent of change, to assist in the process
of reducing inequalities -- starting with health education.
Because agents work for the state, they feel relatively free to speak openly about
problems in the municipio, and to address issues that relate specifically to the circumstances
of the municipio. The health agents in each munic"pio are a socially cohesive group because
they live where they work, they share a common background and interests, and a goal of
improving their municipio. This cohesiveness facilitates collective action (Ostrom 1990,
Attwood & Baviskar 1987 and Wade 1986).
Many agents referred to the areas in which they worked as "my community." They
expressed an intense level of responsibility to their neighbors. Agents often told me that
since working for PAS they have become involved in other community activities. Even
community members often said, "health agents are always organizing community festivals
and other gatherings, they are everywhere."
In several instances agents work beyond their prescribed tasks and induce their
communities to act. In one municipio the agents pressured staff in a bakery to wear hair nets
and wash their hands. In another, agents requested and received free air time on the radio to
name families that left garbage in front of their homes, quickly resolving the problem of
unsightly, disease-breeding, and spoiled garbage piling up in front of homes. Other agents
talked about beginning businesses to stimulate economic growth in their communities.
While many health planners view the potential role of health agents as change-agents
(Werner 1977, Sidel & Sidel 1977, Rifkin 1978), this role is often highly idealistic and
rarely fulfilled (Walt 1988). The Lavors did not expect that the health agents would be
revolutionaries, but believed that incremental reform began by employing low income people,
increasing their knowledge, improving their self esteem, and expanding their leadership
experience and ability to communicate.
The nine-member coordinating team is dedicated to the same philosophy. During a
meeting between a PAS coordinator from Fortaleza and health agents in one municlpio, the
agents raised concern that the families asked for food, which the agents do not provide. The
coordinator asked them what they should do. The group finally decided that the source of
the problem was political, and that the families should ask their mayor and city councilmen
for assistance. Agents learn that they and their communities have a right not only to the
health services, but to other public services.
Even many nurse supervisors endorse the role of agents as change-agents. Several
told me that they tell their health agents to go to the community and fight for its needs. One
nurse related, "If people live four hours from a hospital they should pressure the political
leaders to build a health post, or get an ambulance, or install a telephone." In another
municpio, the agents are working with their supervisor to initiate meetings on family
planning and female sexuality, areas that are not part of the program training.
Combining these small-scale efforts in the state's 177 municpios, one can see the
program's profound impact as a unit. The 7,227 health agents throughout the state visit more
than 800,000 families every month to educate their neighbors and initiate communication and
questioning.
4.4 More Than Mere Selection
Part of the reason the health agents are so effective is because of the unique way in
which they are selected. According to the literature, one problem with CHW programs is
that they do not fulfill a commitment to community participation because the community
seldom selects its own health workers. (Walt et al. 1989, WHO 1989). This is because
program administrators find it cumbersome to mobilize the community to participate. The
PAS program does not include the community in the selection of health agents either. In
Ceard, the governor wished to avoid political patronage by local politicians.
Although the PAS program does not formally include community participation in the
selection, the process itself challenges the community to assume a leadership role as monitors
of the program. The effectiveness of the selection process in encouraging a participatory
role in monitoring the program refutes the notion that health workers should be selected by
the community to be accountable to it.
Because so many people apply for the positions and the coordinators only select a
small percentage as agents, the process spreads important information to beneficiaries of the
program. Often 300 people apply for 30 positions. The coordinators convey two central
messages to the candidates throughout the process: "This program is yours," and "You
determine its success." Thus the selection process increases the program's importance and
reinforces the community's role as program monitors.
At the request of the coordinators, the nurse supervisors first call attention to PAS by
announcing the health agent position in health centers, hospitals, and on the radio. The high
rate of unemployment in the municfpios makes this announcement prominent in the
community. The agents' minimum wage represents a respectable salary in the interior where
80% of the population earns less (PNAD 1989).6 In addition, because the health agents are
some of the few (if not only) people wearing a uniform (blue jeans and a white t-shirts that
says "Health Agent") they are highly visible. This emphasizes their importance and raises
the interest and curiosity of the community in their work.
In PAS, coordinators prepare the community for assuming program responsibility.
They conduct a unique interview process in which health agent candidates learn what may be
expected of them as well as what they should expect from a health agent if they are not
selected. Coordinators tell applicants that although they will not all be hired, their interest in
the position proves their commitment to the community and therefore they should consider
themselves leaders. This is the first of many messages to the health agents and community
members that they are important and powerful members of the munic(pio.
The interview process has three steps. First candidates fill out an application form
that asks them a range of questions about their personal circumstances such as, do they have
children, did they breast-feed and for how long, and do they have eight hours a day to work?
Other questions test their knowledge of the community and their ability to solve problems
such as "What would you do in an emergency situation for which you could not provide
treatment?"
The process does not prohibit illiterate people from applying. Many applicants have
family members or friends who fill out the forms for them. Indeed, while the coordinators
give priority to literate candidates because the work requires that they read and write, both
* For example, agricultural workers, who work for a landowner, earn about half the minimum wage and some
yield in return for their labor. Many teachers earn even less than that.
60
health agents and supervisors informed me that some of the best health agents are illiterate.
The illiterate agents often work with a literate agent who reads and writes for them.
Next, the nurse sends the applications to the coordinators who read each and send
back a list of candidates whom they will interview. Several weeks later two members of the
coordinating team, usually a nurse and a social worker, travel to the municipio to conduct the
last two steps, individual and group interviews. Some characteristics that coordinators look
for in a candidate are communication skills, knowledge of the community, and leadership.
In the individual interview, the coordinator asks a series of questions about the
candidate's qualifications and reasons for wanting to be a health agent. For most applicants,
this is the first time in their lives they have ever experienced an interview, and the first time
they have ever applied for a job. Most candidates sweat and shake from nervousness during
the interview. The group interview is less stressful. The coordinators discuss the program
expectations and health agent responsibilities. Applicants have a chance to ask questions.
Applicants learn the health agents must:
* visit all the families for whom they are responsible once a month;
* attend all training sessions (or at least 90% with a good excuse for absence);
* attend all meetings and review sessions;
* have a monthly evaluation with the supervisor;
* live in the area where they work;
* work 8 hours a day;
* report to the supervisor to resolve any questions or problems; and
* not canvass for a political candidate, or wear or distribute political propaganda.
These details, while standard for any job, contribute to forming the expectations of those not
hired as agents, and provides a monitoring guideline. Coordinators inform applicants not
selected that they should make sure agents abide by the rules. Coordinators tell agents that
they retain all applications and can replace an agent if necessary. This process encourages
hired agents to perform well, and reinforces their accountability to the community.
Candidates also learn that although they are paid by the state, they are not state employees.
They earn a stipend from a special fund directly from the governor's office. They receive no
contract, no benefits, and no tenure. This arrangement places further pressure on the health
agents to perform well because they lack job security and are easily replaced.
To improve quality control of selection, training, and supervision, the coordinators
hire only a few health agents at a time until the program staffing is completed. The process
can take up to three years in some munic(pios. For example, in a large municpio in which
150 health agents would be hired eventually, coordinators first selected 30. The nurse
trained and supervised them and several months later a new selection process hired 30 more
until staffing was complete. The advantage of this slow hiring process is that the community
repeatedly learns about the program through announcements on the radio and in the health
centers, and during the interview process. It also improves the training and supervision
process. By training a small group of health agents first, a new supervisor learns from that
experience and is better prepared for the next group. In addition, the more experienced
health agents can help new ones learn their tasks and provide them support.
Because the selection process informs the community about what to expect from the
agents, the agents feel constant pressure to perform well. For example, if an agent has not
visited a home for a long time, the family may complain to the health center. The
coordinators and supervisors remedy the problem by either hiring an additional agent to
relieve the overburdened agent, or replacing the agent who is not performing well. Also,
people commonly inform supervisors when an agent works in a munictpio other than the one
where she or he lives. This occurred on several occasions, and coordinators fired the agents
because it is strictly forbidden. In addition to monitoring program performance, the
community supports the health agents. When agent performance is good, the beneficiaries
inform the health supervisors when visiting the health center, or when the supervisor visits
them. This approval maintains and improves agents' level of work and morale.
Good performance from health agents requires more than monitoring by the
community. It requires quality training, guidance, and continual evaluation. In addition to
selecting health agents, an important objective of the coordinators has been to pass down the
program philosophy to the nurse supervisors in order that they take on their responsibilities
with the same conviction and vigor. This raises an important question: why are the nurse
supervisors so supportive of the health agents when professionals often resist
paraprofessionals?
4.5 Support From The Professionals
Supervising community members to spread health information is one of the most
rewarding aspects of my career as a nurse because I see health improvements, and we
are working as a community to make this happen. If the nurses in Fortaleza had a
chance to work with these health agents they would agree (Nurse Supervisor in
Iguatd).
One of the most interesting and unusual aspects of PAS is the lack of opposition by
nurse supervisors to paraprofessional health agents. In many CHW programs health
professional supervisors, often nurses, are resistant to paraprofessionals whom they fear
could eventually replace them. (Cumper & Vaughan 1985, Walt et al. 1990, WHO 1989).
Some suggest that because nurses seldom participate in the program's planning, and have
limited training in primary health care, nurses feel detached from the program and are
unsupportive of it (Walt et al. 1990).
In contrast, the PAS nurse supervisors invest energy in their health agents because
good performance of agents reflects well on them. Several supervisors told me that they
work overtime without additional pay because they enjoy their work and believe they are
helping improve the community. The satisfaction they feel about their work strengthens the
performance of their agents as well. The PAS nurses are supportive of the program not only
because they are central decision-makers in the program, but for other important reasons.
First, as mentioned earlier, many of the munici'pios had no nurses before the program
began because political leaders preferred not to spend their resources on additional medical
staff. Therefore many of the nurses in the interior have jobs because of the program, and
would otherwise be seeking employment in a highly competitive market in Fortaleza.
Second, many nurses in the interior earn twice as much as nurses in Fortaleza. This is to
compensate for working in difficult conditions: drought areas, distant from the urban areas
with limited services. Third, the program has boosted both the need and the importance of
rural nurses by increasing the community's use of the formal health system in the rural areas.
Whereas many people are accustomed to using traditional health workers, PAS encourages
the rural population to attend the clinics for prenatal care, immunizations, treatment of
wounds, and to give birth in the hospital. Fourth, agents as well as community members
hold tremendous respect for nurses, referring to them as "doctor." The nurses' role as
supervisors give them increased prestige and recognition in the community.
As found in other CHW programs, in Ceardi not all nurses approve of the program for
reasons identified in the literature. The most vocal criticism of the program comes from
nurses in Fortaleza who are not linked to the program. These nurses believe that the agents
lower professional standards, threaten the security of nurse professionals, and provide
information and services for which they have inadequate training. One of the many
Fortaleza nurses I interviewed about PAS had a bitter look on her face as she showed me a
recent magazine article entitled "The Nurses of the Backlands" (As Enfermeiras do Sertao),
which describes the accomplishments of the health agents. "Why do they earn praise and
recognition for the state's improved health conditions when they have only three months of
training, and we must undergo five years?" she asked me.
Many also fear that if dependence on low paid health agents increases, the need for
nurses will diminish. A member of the Regional Nurses Council (RNC) in Ceard publicly
criticized PAS saying that "Many illiterate nurse attendants hired to clean hospitals and
equipment are now caring for the sickest patients and are untrained to do so." She warned
that in the interior of some states, nurse attendants are heading hospitals and are a source of
cheap and unqualified labor. She warned that PAS health agents will also gain
responsibilities for which they are unqualified.
In the same view, the President of the Federal Nurses Council claimed that health
agents are unqualified to provide care, and are "illegal" and "a risk to the population, and
require more training." (0 Povo 1992). Another nurse criticized the state for creating a
program that is a "distortion" of China's "Barefoot Doctor" program because health agents in
Ceard have much less training than those in China (0 Povo 1991). Because criticism of PAS
remains among nurses not linked to the program, it has not undermined the program. In
fact, the criticism challenges program administrators to consider carefully the services health
agents provide, that they are sufficiently trained, not a danger to the community, and that
they sustain the role of preventive care provider.
4.6 A Little Cure Won't Hurt
I considered moving to Suo Paulo to find work. There was nothing here, but now I
will never leave. I will never abandon my community. I adore my job and I am now
happy here (Maria, health agent in Iguatdi, age 25).
The purpose of creating PAS was to fill a gap not fulfilled by the current health
system: to provide preventive health care to the unserved rural populations and balance a
system which emphasizes curative care. Ironically, an important and useful aspects of the
PAS program is the agent's use of curative care along with their preventive health tasks.
The integration of curative tasks has also contributed to the success of the PAS program. It:
1) gains the acceptance of the community, especially men;
2) alleviates physician overload, and directs more serious curative treatment to health
professionals, and;
3) increases job satisfaction among agents.
The PAS case parallels numerous evaluations of CHW programs world-wide that find
people value and understand curative care more than preventive care (Underwood 1981,
Jancloes 1984, Heggenhougen 1984 & 1987, Berman 1986, Walt 1988, Gilson et al. 1989,
Walt et al. 1989). Whereas curative care treatments show results, preventive care is difficult
to measure and not visibly obvious. People recognize benefits from treatment of a wound
more than they do from a vaccination or prenatal care. Even health agents prefer doing
curative tasks. Educating is a long frustrating process, and many agents have difficulty
getting people to respond. For example, many women prefer bottle-feeding to breast-feeding
and women seldom attend pre-natal appointments. It takes patience and perseverance to
teach them that their breast milk is not "sour and insufficient" as many believe. It is difficult
to convince them to take time out of their day to attend prenatal care appointments. In
contrast, the health agents are inspired by the positive response to the rapid results of
curative treatment.
For this reason, providing small curative tasks helps legitimize the work of agents,
and gains their acceptance by the community. People are often most thankful to the health
agent for having "saved my leg," or "taken my child to the hospital when she was sick."
People appreciate that agents know how to give shots, or remove stitches so they do not have
to return to the health center and wait in long lines to see the nurse or doctor. This inclusion
of curative care also gives health agents opportunities to talk about preventive issues. The
curative tasks are an entryway to the preventive care. One agent said, "I first earned the
respect and trust of families by treating wounds or giving a shot, or even through the oral
rehydration therapy. Now the families listen to me when I talk to them about breast-feeding,
or better hygiene or nutrition, things that don't show immediate results."
The use of curative care has been especially important in gaining the acceptance of
men. In a program that gives priority to women both as employees and as clients, men seem
to both accept and support PAS for two reasons. First, the program's focus on female and
child health discourages men from seeking employment, although 5% of agents are men.
Thus, while some men at first criticize women for earning a high wage, they come to realize
that the work is more appropriately conducted by women. Second, because health agents
learn curative skills, men receive PAS services as well. Men often speak highly of agents.
On one occasion I saw a man stop a health agent on the street to show her how well the leg
she treated from a bicycle accident was healing. I also spoke with husbands of health agents
who were appreciative of the extra income brought in by their wives and were proud of them
and their knowledge.
Another aspect of curative care is that the health agents learn to identify problems and
direct people to health professionals, thus providing a linkage to the medical system. For
example, in Iguatd', a health agent visited a home where a woman was suffering from
leprosy. Because of her training, the agent was able to identify the disease. She carried the
woman on her bicycle for immediate treatment. This is a common scenario.7 Health agents
also reduce the high demand on medical professionals by taking care of minor health
problems. They treat minor wounds, provide advice for treating colds and flu, and treat
other minor problems that are easily solved at home.
Preventive treatments that have a curative appearance are more valued by the
community, and enjoyable to health agents. For example, although oral rehydration therapy
is a measure to prevent death, the treatment seems more like curative care. For example,
health agents reported that when a severely dehydrated baby, near death, took the oral
rehydration solution, hours later he would be playing and spirited.
Making preventive tasks part of a larger campaign also makes the task more
interesting for agents. During the cholera epidemic (currently still in effect) the supervisors
organized special meetings for the agents to educate families about proper hygiene, treating
water and other facts about the disease. The state distributed t-shirts to all agents, and the
municipios provided chlorine to distribute to families. The fear of the epidemic among the
population increased the importance of the agents. Many agents proudly affirmed that in
their municfpio "no one has died from cholera."'
Surrounding preventive tasks around campaigns, such as the cholera epidemic, or
using preventive task that seem curative, such as oral rehydration, are useful ways of
7Interestingly, there has been an increase in the number of reported leprosy cases in Iguatd since PAS began
because health agents are identifying cases that were hidden for years because no one visited these houses. In Iguatd
before 1987 30% of people with leprosy remained crippled from the disease. Now, because it is treated earlier,
less than 10% are left crippled. (Interview with Nurse Maria Laura Bererrade Olivera, head nurse of TB and
leprosy, Iguatd, July 14, 1992.)
'Interestingly, a similar finding exists in agriculture where the performance of the extension workers improved
when the agents undertook disease campaigns. The urgency of the problem, and clearly defined task to confront
the problem, made the task easier and more interesting (Tendler 1991).
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sustaining community acceptance and health agent motivation. It should be warned, however
that there is a risk in reinforcing people's reliance on curative treatment. A major problem
with CHW programs is that health agents increasingly want to provide curative care and the
community wants more curative treatment. Program administrators should be cautious that
the program's preventive health emphasis on is not lost by increased use of curative health.
4.7 Vital Connection Through Data Collection
The thorough collection of data is unusual in Ceard. Many researchers who have
worked in the Northeast have described serious constraints in finding accurate statistical data
(Galvio et al. 1991, Scheper-Hughes 1992). In Ceard, as in many parts of Brazil, many
families do not register their children because of the cost and the high mortality rate.'
Women often wait to see how healthy their baby is and then only register the child if he
attends school. With the PAS program, however, for the first time in Ceard's history, the
state collects detailed data about conditions in most homes in the state's interior.10
In most CHW programs data are often more problematic than useful because they are
collected inaccurately taking away from the health agents' time for educative work, and once
collected data are often not sent to a central office for compilation and analysis (Walt et al.
1990, Heggenhougen 1984, Stark 1985).
"Faulty health statistics are common throughout the developing world where mortality and morbidity are often
not recorded (Heggenhougen & Shore 1986).
'
0PAS agents visit nearly all homes in the interior and use a "child chart" to collect detailed data about the
families: 1) number of people, 2) people who died and causes, 3) weight and nutritional status, 4) vaccination status
of children and mothers, 5) number of mothers breast-feeding, 6) number of domestic animals and their vaccine
status, 7) family's access to water.
In the PAS program, data collection is one of the most important and valued tasks of
the program. It is a vital connection between the different levels of program staff.
Supervisors use this data to evaluate agents' work, monitor them, and help them with their
service delivery. Agents meet once a month with supervisors to report the data collected in
their area. As agents report numbers to the supervisor, the supervisor often stops and talks
with the agent about his/her work. Through this method the supervisor can identify problem
areas and assist the agent in targeting them. Supervisors record and compile the data which
they send to the state monthly. Data collection has been useful in another important way.
Agents use the data to understand conditions in their community and provide care that
corresponds to the community's needs.
For example, when an agent discovered that most of the women in her area were not
attending their appointments for pre-natal care, she and the supervisor discussed the agent's
current approach. Then they sought advice from other agents who reported higher rates of
attendance, and discussed different ways the agent could encourage the mothers to attend.
The group discovered that the reason the attendance was lower was because the clinic was
located far from women's homes and they could not afford either the time or the money to
take public transportation. Although the discussion did not solve the problem during that
meeting, these hard data can be used by supervisors to identify problems beyond the agent's
control, and to demonstrate to local political leaders the need for an additional nurse at a
more nearby health post, or the need to construct an additional health post.
Program coordinators collect data from all 177 municipios which they enter into a
central computer. With these data the state government has been able to see sharp health
improvements and compare towns (see Appendix 2). Coordinators communicate to
supervisors the overall improvement in their town, and share comparative data. The state
emphasizes the importance of data collection because every year the state recognizes the
"best" munictpios based on the percentage of records completed and submitted to the
coordinators. In addition, the state government awards municipios a prize for best
immunization coverage (43 municipios received a prize for the best DPT III-diphtheria,
pertussis & tetanus coverage in the state) (PAS 1992). This motivates the supervisors to
encourage agents to collect data.
Another powerful impact of data collection has been as an educational tool for health
agents. I spoke with a health agent in Jucds who never finished elementary school, but could
use percentages and other numerical descriptions to inform me about the work she is doing.
What impressed me more than her report of a 30% increase in breast-feeding in her town in
the past five years was the fact that she was describing it in relatively sophisticated numerical
terms. Agents have learned to think and communicate in more advanced ways than their
lives previously demanded. With this information, the health agent has a comprehensive
understanding of the problems and conditions in her community. And with a new way of
thinking she can more easily and accurately describe these conditions to her neighbors.
Additionally, she teaches the community how to think and communicate in these terms.
By expanding the role of local governments and ending patronage, two governors
have turned an impoverished Brazilian state into a model. And their health-care
reforms have won international acclaim (The Christian Science Monitor, March,
1993)
5. CONCLUSION
The PAS program has performed well for five years, and has already been recognized
internationally for this success. Nevertheless, the long-term success of PAS has not yet been
established. Before concluding this study by highlighting aspects of the program that make it
work so well, it is important to examine the program's ability to continue carrying out its goal
for primary health care (PHC). Two important questions are: 1) How can the state sustain the
enthusiasm of workers? 2) Will the health agents continue to assume a role that meets the needs
of the community?
With the dramatic drop in infant mortality, the health agents enjoyed rapid recognition
and praise locally, nationally, and even internationally. The recognition of PAS on television,
in newspapers, and in magazines energized workers at all levels -- the agents, supervisors, and
the coordinators. Success at the beginning of project implementation, labeled as "good starts,"
is found to improve worker performance (Tendler 1992).
Having an easy fast success at the start puts an agency on a roll that propels it into the
succeeding, less dramatic stages. It now has a standard of performance to meet that is
defined by its own performance in the earlier period, a newly acquired good reputation
that it is proud of and wants to keep, and a new confidence about its ability to make
things happen (Tendler 1992).
Yet even with success at the beginning to establish a high performance level and stimulate
enthusiasm, the attention given to PAS workers is likely to wane, as is worker motivation. PAS
workers at all levels assume enormous responsibility for the community and work many hours
beyond what is expected of them. I spoke with supervisors and health agents, who, despite their
enthusiasm were exhausted by the demands and high energy required. With the double burdens
of work and home responsibilities for the mostly female work force, I wondered how long their
enthusiasm could last. Sustaining high worker performance requires that the job remain
interesting, challenging, and rewarding for health agents, and that the workers continue to see
the direct benefits of their work. This leads to the question about the role of health agents.
The program founders envisioned a role for community workers in preventive health
because infant mortality was so high and the health services so inadequate. Current criticism
by nurses in Fortaleza of the agents' administering some curative care has led PAS
administrators to consider requiring health agents to undergo formal training as nurse assistants.
This specified professional training is risky because it could lead health agents further away from
their primary mission: preventive health care. The program could lose its effectiveness if the
health workers change their focus from preventive care workers to more narrowly defined
medical technicians. For example, if a decentralized health system is fully institutionalized and
munic(pios assume greater responsibility for providing primary health care (PHC) services, the
health agents may need to shift their role to meet other pressing needs in the community.
Agents might better serve the population working as agricultural extensionists, initiating small
community enterprises, eliminating environmental hazards, or perhaps assisting with the design
and establishment of improved housing or infrastructure, all underlying PHC activities that
address people's health conditions. As nurse assistants they would not be able to make such a
transition. Program administrators must consider carefully whether the role of the agents is
indeed to realize PHC objectives, and if this includes a possible function beyond that of health.
One of the most important, and yet least controllable factors that will determine the
sustainability of PAS, is the will of the state government to continue the program. A change
in government priority could end the program instantly. Yet, after five years of successful
experience it is likely that, even if PAS were to end, the lessons from this experience will
endure. The collaboration of two governments, the breaking of patronage, the education and
skill-building of 7,000 workers, the leadership training provided to 250 nurses, and the
knowledge that is already spread to more than four million people in Ceard are only some of the
experiences that will have a beneficial impact on the future of Ceara.
Ceard faces challenges common to other developing areas afflicted with poverty, poor
health, uneven distribution of resources, weak government institutions, and other difficult
conditions. Yet Ceard is unusual because it has successfully surmounted difficulties that many
other regions have not. I end this section by highlighting several successful approaches taken
by the government of Ceard to implement and administer the Programa de Agente de Sade.
Ceard's experience can serve as a model for planners and policy-makers in other regions of the
world, in health as well as other sectors.
Some of the key lessons that emerge from the PAS program stem from its movement
from a pilot project to a large-scale state program and are related to the program's linkage to
government and the division of labor between the state and municipios. The first lesson is that:
The program designers engaged in careful planning and from a technical and operational
perspective and met the priorities outlined in the Alma Ata Conference of 1978 as critical
for program success which include the proper selection, supervision, training, and
evaluation of health care workers (Alma Ata 1978: 18).
They built on their own experience, took time to learn from the experience of others both in
Ceari and internationally, and seized political opportunity when they were prepared.
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As a result, they implemented quality selection, training, supervision, and evaluation of health
agents. They incorporated a good data collection system and included some curative care.
The second and third lessons involves what few programs acknowledge as critical to its success.
The first is that:
The PAS founders and state governor did not expect that poor health in Ceard, which
stems from a faulty government system, could be solved by a health program outside the
government system without efforts to reform that system.
The linkage of PAS to the state government is important because poor health conditions
are, in part, a result of a faulty political system of which public health is a part. The purpose
of the PAS program was to improve the state's health conditions by becoming an integral part
of the health system. The founders realized that the health system had to change to support
PAS. By linking PAS to the government system, the program reinforces and influences the
health system and contributes to improved health conditions. PAS contributes to health reform
by functioning in each locality, informing local leaders and the general public about health-
related issues and problems, and preparing them to assume increased responsibility.
Health reform in Ceard emerged from an underlying movement that existed within Ceard
among NGOs and medical professionals, and from the outside -- both nationally and
internationally. These efforts are important because they show a larger campaign behind the
charisma and determination of the Lavors, demonstrating that the program's success was not
dependent on their efforts alone. The Lavors identified and unified the efforts that already
existed to bring about reform in the state. They avoided political sabotage by gaining the
support of the community, political leaders, and medical professionals before implementing PAS,
and by preventing political patronage. The third important lesson that emerges from PAS is:
Dividing responsibility for PAS between the local and state government solves the
problem of one government (or institution) assuming full responsibility for a complicated
program, and takes advantage the relative strengths of each to create a more manageable
program.
In its move from a pilot to a state program, PAS retained the successful qualities it had
as a small pilot project. The state divided responsibility with municipios causing PAS to scale
out into 177 programs, not one large effort administered and run solely by the state government.
The state serves as an umbrella over the individually running programs in each municipio. It
institutes consistency by providing uniforms and supplies, determining the agents' primary tasks,
(such as oral rehydration and pre-natal care information), and establishing general program rules.
The state's selection of health agents, conducted similarly in each munic"pio, sets universal
policy of the program, and increases accountability of the agents to their community because it
challenges the communities to assume a leadership role as monitors.
By decentralizing operations, small, manageable programs function in each of the state's
munictpios which thereby respond to the needs of their citizens. Within each municpio, nurses
can train agents to perform tasks that respond to local needs, and agents and supervisors feel
rewarded because they see direct benefits of their decision-making and work. Importantly, the
failure or success of one municipio does not affect the program as a whole. In addition, the
large number of health programs that operate simultaneously throughout the state places a check
on the mayors' discretionary powers, serve as examples to other munictpios of good or poor
performance, and give communities increased power to ask for services. Finally, this
collaboration between two levels of government is valuable experience, preparing them to engage
in further collaborative efforts in other sectors in the future.
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APPENDIX 1
Interviews Conducted in Ceard. Brazil
June - August, 1992
Fortaleza
UNICEF Representatives
2 PAS Coordinators
Secretary of Health,
Planning Coordinator
3 nurses from the Regional Nurses Council
Coordinator of Viva Crianga
Medical Anthropologist
Meeting of Health Agents in Palmeiras (observation)
Director of PROIAS
PAS Coordinators (2)
Secretary of Education of Ceard
Nurse at FSESP
Director of Project Hope
Midwives (3)
Geral Sampaio
Selection process of health agents (observation)
Icapii
Health agents (2)
PAS Supervisor
Secretary of Planning
Secretary of Education
Iguate July 1-3 and July 14-17
Nurses at health center (5)
Supervisors of PAS (3)
Secretary of Health
Nurse in private health center
Nurses from hospitals (3)
Midwife
Health agents (17)
Doctors (4)
Jucds
Health agents (8)
Priest
PAS supervisor
Nurses at health center (3)
Secretary of Health
Husband of health agent
Supervisor of Pastoral de Crianga
Dr. Carlile Lavor
Miriam Lavor
Carius
PAS supervisor
Health agents
Secretary of Health
Ouixel6
Nurse assistant (3)
Secretary of Education
City Councilman
Traditional healer
PAS supervisor
Health agents (6)
Secretary of Health
Crateds
PAS supervisor (2)
Secretary of Health
Regional Director of Health
City Councilmen (3)
Secretary of Planning
Bishop
Health Council Meeting (observation)
Doctors (5)
Ipaporanga, Nova Russas and, Independencia
PAS supervisors
Nurses in health center
Dentist
Doctor
*In all of the municIpios I interviewed numerous families and health agents. The above
list is limited to in-depth interviews or agents or nurses I accompanied all day in their
work.
APPENDIX 2
Level of Health Activity in Areas with Health Agents
as Compared to Areas without Health Agents
Ceard, Brazil
MUNICIPIO
ACTIVITIES WITH AGENTS (%) WITHOUT AGENTS (%)
Pregnant women who receive 87 47
pre-natal care
Pregnant women who receive 73 58
from 1 to 3 doses of
anti-tetanus vaccine
Presence of "measuring 67 53
spoon" in homes to prepare
oral rehydration solution
Knowledge of how to use 73 61
the "spoon"
Given vaccinations of the
following:
* DTP 82 67
* Measles 86 63
*BCG 88 72
Children weighed three months 57 27
before survey
Child's weight marked on a 55 39
growth chart
Source: Secretary of Health/Health Agent Program, 1990
APPENDIX 3
CHRONOLOGY OF PAS
1968 Dr. Carlile Lavor and Miriam Lavor set up a community health worker
program in Brasilia.
1978 The Lavors travel throughout South America to explore other community
health worker (CHW) programs, and initiate an affiliation with UNICEF.
1979 The Lavors implement a pilot CHW program in Jucis, Ceari, and learn
from pioneer programs throughout Ceari.
1985 The Lavors build a coalition of medical professionals to campaign for
Tasso Jerreisati.
1986 Tasso Jerreisati is elected governor of Ceari. The governor appoints Dr.
(March) Lavor as Secretary of Health.
1987 Dr. Lavor begins restructuring the health system and initiates Viva
Crianga to educate the general public and medical professionals about
primary health care.
(September) With federal funds, the state implements the health agent program (PAS)
as part of a drought emergency employment program.
1988 The PAS program discontinues when the drought emergency
(August) ends and federal funding terminates.
1989 The state re-initiates the PAS program with state funding beginning in 45
(January) of the state's municipios.
APPENDIX 4
Approximate Cost of PAS
In US$ During a 12-Month Period
SPENDING SALARIES SUPPLIESt TOTAL
STATE
-health agents 5,200,000 20,000 5,220,000
7,227__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _
MUNICIPIO 810,000 Amount 810,000*
-Supervisors (about 15 % of varies
225 program
(avg. $300/month) cost)
TOTAL 6,010,000 N/A 6,030,000
t Supplies provided by the state include a blue backpack, white t-shire, blue jeans, and
non-medicinal first-aid materials. Some municipios provided bicycles, canoes or donkeys
as various modes of transportation for agents.
* All of the above cost estimates are based solely on interviews. Brazil's economy is
highly unstable and inflationary. PAS employees are paid on a monthly basis. The pay
rate is based on the minimum wage which is multiplied depending on the skill,
professional level, or discretion of the employer. For instance, the health agents earn
one minimum wage per month ($60). The average nurse supervisor is paid
approximately 5 minimum wages per month ($300).
